The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice Longuenesse (review) by Erkan, Ekin
The First Person in Cognition and Morality by Béatrice 
Longuenesse (review) 
Ekin Erkan
The Review of Metaphysics, Volume 73, Number 4 (Issue No, 292), June 2020,
pp. 846-848 (Review)
Published by The Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
For additional information about this article
[ Access provided at 21 Jun 2020 02:29 GMT from Columbia University Libraries ]
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/757474
846   ELIZABETH C. SHAW AND STAFF 
 
 
answers, with a subsequent list of points meant to drive the case home. 
Excessive repetition across chapters mars the book as a whole, which is 
unfortunate given the obvious skill the author has at expressing his 
thinking.  
Overall, Kulp makes his case for the validity of commonsense moral 
understanding by presenting a nonnaturalistic theory of moral realism 
with clarity and vigor. With light, humorous, and provocative examples, 
the book exhibits his excellent ability to work out in technical detail the 
metaphysical corollaries of the central claim that ordinary moral thinking 
is valid.—Kayhan A. Özaykal, Istanbul University 
LONGUENESSE, Béatrice. The First Person in Cognition and Morality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2020. vii + 73 pp. Paper, $15.00—Longuenesse’s 
metaphysical stipulation is that consciousness in the rational unity of our 
thinking is more fundamental than consciousness of our proprioceptive 
body, for being attentive to the rational unity of content(s) in one’s 
thinking is what makes it possible to assess the standpoints from which 
we initially formulate, and then arrive at, shared universal conclusions. 
Two dichotomies transpire: singular/universal and bodily/rational. What is 
radically individual in what we assert of ourselves is what is true of us as 
an entity individuated in space and time—existence as a material 
organism. However, with these specific uses—the apperceptive “I think” 
or the moral “I ought to”—what we are asserting of ourselves is, according 
to Longuenesse, the exercise of capacities that, by principle, we share 
universally. It is not that this “I” is not indexical, for it still refers to an 
individuated entity; rather, with “I think,” if I am correct to say that there 
are “users” of “I,” such that “I” am the thinker of “I think,” then “I” is still 
individual. Yet, I am also asserting something universal. In Kant’s case, 
and in Longuenesse’s view as a faithful Kantian, this is not an ontological 
claim (unlike, for instance, with Descartes or Aristotle) but an 
epistemological claim entangled with the metaphysics of mind.  
Thus, we have a formidable response to Lichtenberg’s oft-quoted claim 
that we should say “it thinks” or “there is thinking going on” rather than “I 
think,” as well as a response to Nietzsche’s notorious notion that thoughts 
come about when they will and not when “I” will them. Rather than 
asserting the Cartesian argument of “self” as thinking-identity, 
Longuenesse defends that in cases of “I think” nothing is necessary to 
competently use the first-person pronoun “I” aside from mastery, implicit 
or explicit, of a fundamental reference-rule (that is, the “thinker-rule”). On 
one hand, “I” refers to the producer of the thought. However, the predicate 
attributed to “I” produces a kind of consciousness of self that is the basis 
of making a statement where “I” is indicated, which references embodied 
consciousness (“I am jumping”), thinking (“I think the proof is valid”), or 
both embodiment and thinking (“I see a magnolia”). Indeed, there is 
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always the singularity of “I,” and sometimes this singular “I” stands for the 
particular embodied entity that we can individuate in space, time, and 
biography; however, sometimes that very “I,” which remains individuated 
by the reference-rule, stands for all thinkers. When I say, “I think this proof 
is valid,” there is nothing beyond the fact that I am engaged in that thought 
that should make the predicate valid particularly for me or anyone else. 
Moving from theoretical cognition to practical cognition, Longuenesse 
demonstrates how our use of “I” in the moral “I ought to” is premised, as 
in the use of “I” in “I think,” on a type of self-consciousness that has both 
an individual “I” and the claims to universal validity of those first-person 
moral models exercised in “I (morally) ought to X” or “I am (morally) 
obligated to X.” Longuenesse stipulates that Freud’s genealogy of the 
moral imperative is compatible with Kant’s investigation of the 
justificatory structure of a priori cognition and moral reasoning. That is, 
Freud’s notion of ego is proximous to the consciousness of one’s own 
body and the two types of self-consciousness fundamental to use of “I”: 
(1) consciousness of being engaged in establishing rational unity among 
the contents of one’s mental states, and (2) consciousness of one’s 
body/its position in the world. 
Accordingly, Freud’s genealogy of both ego and superego contributes 
to our understanding of the combination of particular and universal claims 
carried by our use of “I” in the moral “I ought to.” Longuenesse makes the 
point that, for Freud, there is a connection between organizing the 
contents of mental events according to logical rules (organization proper 
to the ego) and the ability to cognize in the first-person. For Freud, the 
ego’s organization (das Ich) is paramount for indexically using the word 
and concept Ich (“I”). This position is strikingly similar to Kant’s, for 
whom unifying our perceptual inputs according to logical rules is a 
necessary condition for thinking in the first person. For Kant, our use of 
“I” expresses the transcendental unity of apperception: unity in our 
consciousness of the features of objects, which is also a unity of our self-
consciousness, that is, our consciousness of being ourselves and being 
engaged in bringing rational unity into the contents of our perceptual 
states and into our thoughts. According to Kant’s categorical imperative, 
morality is universalizable because self-legislation has a universal 
foundation, as it allots us with being capable of a universal standpoint 
shared by all human beings cum rational beings. This capability of a 
universal standpoint in cognition allows us to access the particular 
reasons we may have to act in one way rather than another, as well as 
claiming normative validity in willing. 
Vis-à-vis self-governance, Longuenesse draws us to Freud’s curious 
claims that Kant’s categorical imperative is heir to the Oedipus complex. 
For Freud, the ground level of moral attitude is emotion (stationed in the 
id and its superego) and is a feature of mental life imposed through 
development from childhood through the stages of adulthood. Regardless 
of whether the origin of morality is in the id and its outgrowth, the 
superego, the “energy” of the id is enrolled in the task of internalizing the 
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features of the ego into the mental life of the young child. For Freud, the 
reasoning behind Kant’s categorical imperative being heir to the Oedipus 
complex amounts to saying that its categorical nature has emotional roots 
and that the unconditional demands of morality rest upon emotional life, 
which also sustains the development of the ability to assess, endorse, or 
reject justifications of moral commands. On Freud’s account, it is the 
proper work of the ego to transform our emotional attitudes—the moral 
attitude more than any other—into reasoned attitudes. 
According to Freud’s genealogical claim, determinate structure is 
provided not by reason/its universal principle but by the structure of 
developmental interdictions and renunciations, which are subsequently 
internalized. Despite this internalization, its original structure, which 
provides for the context of what is originally categorical in norms of 
behavior, remains. Acquiring knowledge of facts of the matter about the 
world (the ego’s “reality principle”) counters the repeated “spinning” of 
fantasies born from earlier, uncontrolled traumatic experiences. This can 
be executed via the expression of individual recovering relations to the 
existing, current world of object to which one’s emotions connect. (Freud 
designates this recovery as the role of talk therapy.)  
Both the Kantian model and Freud’s genealogical model posit 
overriding personal interest in favor of the categorical commands of 
obligations. For Freud, the enlargement of moral concerns runs in parallel 
with the human infant’s development vis-à-vis internalization of norms 
that trump self-interested rules of instrumental agency, resulting in an 
integration of norms into rational positions concerning the world one 
inhabits; this depends on three factors: original internalization of norms, 
current social context, and perceptive expansion of our moral compass 
according to ego’s reality principle. Freudian perception is not directed at 
ourselves/self-perception but at ourselves in the world. Thus, the moral “I 
ought” illuminates a combination of the particular standpoint premised on 
individual emotional biography and rationally endorsed binding. In 
singling out Kant’s categorical imperative as the heir of the Oedipus 
complex, Freud, reminding us of the archaic roots of morality in human 
psychology, voices agreement with Kant’s position that the moral attitude 
is made necessary by the fact that conflicts between egoistic interest and 
categorical moral commands arise necessarily and can be resolved 
through restless searching, “engaging each of us individually and all of us 
rationally with the same urgent normative demand.”—Ekin Erkan, CUNY 
Graduate Center 
  
